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Aidan Cornelius-Bell

I’m a social scientist and activist looking to create systemic change that serves the proletariat. I care about compassion, justice, genuine equity, reciprocity and radical social change.

The labour process, atomisation and social media

Dear friends,

As I grow increasingly concerned about the level of influence Zucc has with his near monopoly on social media, I concomitantly grow concerned about the atomisation of workers and mystification of the labour process. Today, I’d like to spend a bit of time talking about social bonds, and the “cohesion” of society. In particular, I think we need to spend some time truly attending to how the common sense has shifted to a worship of individual billionaires, giving way to a rise of front-seat oligarchs directly in control of abstracting worker connection to production, and to direct control of the machinery of government [1]. Naturally, I’m also concerned with how this will play out in Australia given the commencement of Albanese’s campaigning, but let’s take it one step at a time [2].

The atomisation of workers in contemporary times is extreme. Capitalism benefits when solidarity is eroded, and it has played the long game to get here — gradually loosening social bonds outside production since the 1980s as tightening hegemony ensures compliance [3]. Where once workers might have gathered in union halls, community centres, and especially pubs to discuss our shared conditions and build solidarity, today’s “flexible” work arrangements and digital mediation of social life have effectively isolated us from genuine collective experience.

The 2020s have ushered unprecedented shifts in how work, ownership, and accumulation function under capitalism. Remote work, platform-mediated gig labour, and algorithmic management have created new forms of alienation and control that Marx may only have had nightmares about [4]. Ownership itself has become increasingly abstract, with workers now renting rather than owning everything from housing to software licenses to the tools of their trade, while capitalists accumulate wealth through increasingly financialised means nearly devoid of ‘traditional’ production. The capitalist class has evolved from factory owners to tech oligarchs and financial speculators who control not just the means of production but the very infrastructure of daily life. The rise of management consultancies has added another parasitic layer to this exploitation, with firms like McKinsey, BCG, and Deloitte extracting massive profits by telling companies how to squeeze more value from workers while simultaneously deskilling the professional class through the outsourcing of strategic thinking. Oh, and let’s not forget, literally changing legislation to be more favourable to outsourcing to consultancies [5]. These consultancies serve as high priests of capitalism, legitimising mass layoffs and worker surveillance while building dependency on their own services. Hot.

The ever shifting landscape of contemporary capitalist life hasn’t, however, changed the fundamental relations of exploitation. It has only intensified them. We’ve talked about how this has fed configurations of what Varoufakis calls technofeudalism, where digital platforms function as fiefs extracting rent from all social activity [6]. The resulting workforce is more precarious and atomised than ever, scrambling to piece together livelihoods through multiple ‘side hustles’ while the capitalist class accumulates wealth at historically unprecedented rates.

The fragmentation, atomisation, and espoused individualism is not an accident, though little is under capitalism. These are tools which serve capital’s need to prevent class consciousness from emerging through shared experience. Something that the internet briefly offered, at least for western nations. As Marx noted in the Grundrisse, capital must constantly revolutionise not only the means of production, but also the social relations that surround them. What we’re witnessing now is the culmination of this process, where even our non-work time has been colonised by capital’s logic of individualisation and competition. Work by Fuchs [7] has shown how platform capitalism has accelerated this atomisation, creating new forms of alienation where workers feel “more connected” yet are in reality more isolated than ever before. Look no further than Meta’s AI profiles, you’ll never know if content on any of Zucc’s platforms is from an actual human again.

Social media platforms, far from bridging isolation, intensify it through use of sensationalised timelines, manipulation of content, and broadly just ‘attention seeking’. The feeds we scroll through distracting us from our material conditions, something humans are very good at overlooking after years of conditioning, and now social media — from a very young age, despite Labor’s attempts to ban young people — actively training us to view ourselves as personal brands competing for attention in a marketplace of identity. This militant individualism, amplified by engagement-driven algorithms, transforms legitimate class grievances into personal challenges to be overcome through self-optimisation rather than collective struggle. We’ve cited Zuboff heavily on this in the past, where she argues that surveillance capitalism isn’t just interested in our attention, but actually epistemic reshaping such that our conception of social relations fits in a digital consumer / individualistic / market-driven framework to enable exploitation on all fronts at all times [8].

The social division of labour here has evolved — and not in a good way. Today’s workers are not simply alienated from the products of our labour but through layers of hegemonic coercion, we are taught to look away from any kind of understanding of production, let alone social production. The totality of these systems, functioning together — hegemony and specific capitalist enforcement — has created conditions for the working class that obscures any solidarity. Digital platforms spewing toxic pro-capital narratives, intensified automation of systems, deskilling of workers, deprofessionalising technicians and so on all serves as the latest in obstructions to understanding the real relations between workers, between workers and production, and production and capital accumulation, making it ever more difficult to recognise our shared conditions of exploitation. When an office worker orders lunch delivery through an app, the social relations between them and the delivery worker are mystified through digital mediation. Naturally, this mystification serves capital by preventing workers from recognising our common interests across these artificially created divisions.

Social media’s role in managing workers’ understanding of our own labour power cannot be overstated. Platforms ­— and increasingly “platform” as Zucc takes over and outstrips the remaining ‘others’ through legislative lobbying — are now simply instruments of hegemonic control, manufacturing consent for capitalist relations through a constant stream of content that naturalises exploitation, promotes individualistic solutions to collective problems, and SELLS PRODUCTS! When we spend our free time scrolling through “hustle culture” content or “financial literacy” advice — god help you if you spend any time on LinkedIn [9] — we are being conditioned to view our exploitation as a personal challenge, nothing that would need a collective response.

The recent trend of CEO capitulation to increasingly extreme right-wing positions, particularly visible in figures like Musk, Cook and Zuckerberg, just proves how alive and well anti-worker sentiment is amongst the capitalist class. Yet does this despotism phase users? Are you still on Facebook? Do you still buy Apple products? Then you are supporting fascism — and yes, there’s no such thing as ethical consumption under capitalism, but we now see these figures directly in bed with neonazis, and that should give us more than pause. These figures no longer feel the need to maintain a pretence of caring about workers, instead openly embracing authoritarian politics that promise to cement their control. Importantly, the shift isn’t about individual CEOs, rather it is indicative of the whole capitalist class becoming more bold in their authoritarian turn. To put it clearly: we are seeing capital’s recognition that maintaining hegemony through consent is becoming increasingly difficult as contradictions intensify. The mask-off moment we’re witnessing, where billionaires openly support fascist politics, shows how capital will readily abandon democratic pretences when its accumulation is threatened — or when individual capitalists (and their boot licking managerial class) are threatened [10].

What strikes me about the latest reactionary moment, here, is how social media platforms themselves have become key instruments for advancing this anti-worker agenda. “Mainstream” platforms (read: FB, Insta, Snap, etc.) are safe harbours for pro-capitalist content, while anything counter-hegemonic is quickly demonetised, downplayed or blocked. When Musk purchases Twitter or Zuckerberg shapes Facebook’s algorithms to promote right-wing content, they’re not expressing personal political preferences, in fact I’d be surprised if they had them, they are simply deploying their control over digital infrastructure to actively suppress class consciousness and promote reactionary politics. Can’t fight them if we’re fighting each other. And this is the fundamental issue of platform monopoly ownership. Can we just go back to everyone having blogs? (I’m giving it a shot!)

Again, we’re just on the latest page in the long line of class warfare tactics. Nothing here is new, and nothing here is revolutionary. The capitalists and perhaps more importantly their petit bourgeois boot licker enforcement class are out to ensure only the ultra-wealthy have any kind of quality of life, based on our work. The means of digital communication themselves are increasingly weapons in capital’s arsenal against worker solidarity — and only through decentralising (i.e., not using FB, Insta, Snap, TikTok, YouTube, etc.) and returning to diverse platforms and perspectives can we hope to combat these tools of hegemonic enforcement.

Go write a blog!

In solidarity,
Aidan


  1. c.f. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2025/01/04/elon-musk-uk-germany-canada-far-right/ ↩︎

  2. https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2025/jan/06/anthony-albanese-switches-to-election-footing-with-blitz-of-three-campaign-battlegrounds ↩︎

  3. also, interestingly, c.f. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0003687022002174 ↩︎

  4. https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/files/98056652/Labour_process_theory_and_GANDINI_Accepted25June2018_GREEN_AAM.pdf ↩︎

  5. For lucid analysis see https://marianamazzucato.com/books/the-big-con/ ↩︎

  6. https://www.penguin.com.au/books/technofeudalism-9781529926095 ↩︎

  7. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003222149 (and several other books, dude’s prolific) ↩︎

  8. https://shoshanazuboff.com/book/about/ ↩︎

  9. https://sh.itjust.works/c/linkedinlunatics ↩︎

  10. https://archive.is/2025.01.05-014335/https://medium.com/@kimpistilli/before-luigi-mangione-there-was-fred-hampton-f55a2728de13 ↩︎

On class

Dear friends,

Let’s take a voyage together through three understandings of class. This concept is becoming increasingly interesting to me, particularly in relationship to transformative movements. Across history a great many Marxists, and others who on occasion appropriated from Marx and Marxists (looking at you Bourdieu), have debated class as a (social/political/economic/determining) construct. The brackets, here, are worth some discussion but let’s first think about defining some key terms that will be useful for us as we progress through this discussion.

At the source class can be understood in terms of a person’s relative relationship to the means of production. The means of production ranges from: (1) the physical spaces where work happens (factories, farms, offices), (2) the tools and machinery used in production (from hammers to industrial equipment), (3) the raw materials that are used to make things (iron ore, cotton, oil — also referred to as the subjects of labour), to (4) the knowledge and technology required for production (know how, processes). For Marx, there is a cleaving of humanity in two: those who own these means of production (the capitalists or bourgeoisie) and those who must sell their labour (power) because they do not own these means (the working class or proletariat). Even partial ownership of any one of these categories of things places you in the capitalist class.

You might already viscerally feel the politics dripping from each of these sentences. This is a somewhat ‘orthodox’ view because it is shaped directly by Marx’s work in Capital. But many, if not all, theorists who have followed in the historical materialist tradition have engaged with class conceptually as it emerges (from where remains a debate). Much later on theoretically the base has been conceptualised as an ontological (real, physical) force which not only conditions how we live, but also how we might live, in a a way that is inescapable. But let’s not get ahead of ourselves, we’re concerned with class, not the nature of all things (or are we, I’m already lost).

Let me work an example with you, using this orthodoxy, and we’ll retain this example as we discuss a few historical materialist (Marxist in different words) conceptions of class. Let me introduce to you Fillipe, who works in a civil servant job as an administrator for the Department of Social Inclusion (this is not even a vaguely real person and I have little idea how DSI actually works — it’s just a context for our discussion). A civil servant working in social inclusion occupies a contradictory class position — okay, great, why are we starting here? Because boundaries make things interesting, and they are very real in our contempoary “late capitalist” context. Fillipe doesn’t (directly) own the means of production. Going by our definitions above this plants them in the working class. Sweet — job done? Not quite. They also don’t directly produce surplus value in the classical Marxist sense, as their labour isn’t directly involved in commodity production. You’re not directly involved in transmuting oil into plastic ergo some historical materialists argue that you are not, then, working class. Poulantzas, for instance, would argue, instead, that they are part of the “new middle class” or petit bourgeoisie. From here, let’s move to a contrasting perspective with elucidatory potential, and we’ll revisit Poulantzas in a moment.

For Gramsci, class formation is a historical process that goes beyond economic position. Two things are important here — the historical nature of class and class formation, and the role of economic position. The role of history in class formation is important, beyond mechanistic or formulaic notions of “class”, as it shows that the character of class is always predefined and carries the weight of generations: “[t]he tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living” [1]. Here, we begin to see some of the “organic” thinking Gramsci did which is, to me, more humanistic than Marx. While Gramsci maintains Marx’s core insight about the relationship to production, he sees, in parallel, classes as being formed through political and cultural processes. He is particularly interested in how different social groups come to understand their interests and organise themselves politically.

Gramsci introduces the concept of “organic intellectuals”, people who emerge from within social classes to articulate their interests and organise their political projects, and “traditional intellectuals”, professionals, civil servants, and others who see themselves as independent from class interests but actually play a crucial role in organising social life (for capitalism’s reproduction). These intellectuals, to Gramsci, are essential in understanding bourgeoisie and proletarian interests, and the social and cultural conditions that construct their class’s broader positioning. Theoretically this also introduces a level of nuance to the organisation of human behaviour atop the economic “base” which is helpful for understanding modern economic organisation. Let’s return to Fillipe, with particular interest in the intellectual position they might hold in this fictional representation.

Our civil servant occupies what Gramsci would call an intermediary position as a type of state intellectual. They’re not simply a “neutral administrator” but are involved in organising social relations and mediating between different class interests. What makes this position especially complex is that civil servants in social services sometimes come to see themselves as advocates for “subordinate groups” (subalterns) while simultaneously being part of the state apparatus that maintains existing social relations. Gramsci would be interested in how such officials might sometimes act as organic intellectuals for subaltern groups (advocating for their interests within the state) while simultaneously functioning as traditional intellectuals who help maintain social order. Where does this position Fillipe? Are they bourgeoisie? Are they proletarian? Are they sandwiched between?

Their class background would matter significantly in Gramsci’s analysis, but not in a simple deterministic way. He would be interested in how their background shapes their understanding of their role and their relationship to different social groups. A civil servant from a working class background will have different capacities to connect with and understand subaltern groups, but their position within the state apparatus would still shape how they can act on that understanding. This nuance, which I have argued on several occasions is fundamental to activist transformation, is what sets Gramscian understandings of class apart. Rather than troubling who is part of what class, and how the schema for understanding class is used, Gramsci holds with Marx’s “distance” notion, and offers fluidity for how human action is subsequently shaped (or not) by class and social (group) connection. The modern state creates its own social categories and class fractions through its bureaucratic structures — but fundamentally there remains the “owners” and the “workers”. Civil servants aren’t only members of pre-existing (historical) classes but part of what Gramsci saw as new social formations created by modern state institutions. The purpose of these formations is, naturally, dubious and may be exploited in identity politics, but coexists with and is informed in part by class origins in important ways that condition agency.

Poulantzas, contrastingly, spent a great deal of time building on and significantly developing Marxist class theory as a primary concern. He argues that class positions are determined not just by economic relations, but by the combined effects of economic, political, and ideological relations. This, in itself, is similar to how Gramsci conceptualised class and/or social group formations. For Poulantzas, classes only exist in class struggle. They are not fixed categories but dynamic relationships. He emphasises that class positions are objective – they exist independently of whether people are conscious of them – but they are also complex and can be contradictory. Great, thanks for that clarification Nicos. Let’s get clearer.

Poulantzas pays particular attention to what he calls the “new petty bourgeoisie”. This group is, to him, inclusive of technical workers, civil servants, and other white-collar employees. Unlike some Marxists who would fit these groups into traditional categories of workers or capitalists, Poulantzas saw them as occupying distinct class positions shaped by their role in organising and supervising labour, their position in ideological relations (like education and culture), and their relationship to state power. This is congruent with contemporary notions of a “middle class” which exists, primarily, to manage production and enforce the reproductive processes of capitalism broadly. Crucially, Poulantzas argues that the state isn’t exclusively a subservient domain of the ruling class but that it has relative autonomy. He suggests that state workers, including civil servants, occupy class places that are defined by their position in political and ideological relations, not just economic ones. This helps explain why state workers might sometimes act against the immediate interests of capital while still ultimately helping to reproduce capitalist social relations. This also gives us reasons why liberal reformism will never work, but that’s a topic for another day.

Let us be extremely clear that in Poulantzas’s view only those immediately located at the nexus of production without any ownership of the means of production can be considered working class. To me, this is an extremely limited view, but it doesn’t end here. Poulantzas also clearly notes that while there may be some autonomy in the roles of the petit bourgeoisie or rather, specifically, his nouveau petit bourgeoisie, their primary function and continued existence is dependent on utter subservience to capital. This self loathing positionality of inaction is another point of contribution to Marxist’s praxis stasis – but, again, a conversation for another day. Let’s spend a bit more time with Nicos before we wrap up.

A production line worker in a car factory might represent what Poulantzas sees as productive labour in its most direct sense. They are directly involved in producing surplus value through manual labor in the production process. Their position is defined by both their economic relationship (not owning means of production, selling labor power) and their place in the social division of labor (manual rather than mental labour). This gels directly with the orthodox Marxist understanding. A nurse in a public hospital presents a more complex case. While they perform essential labour, Poulantzas would classify this as unproductive labour in the strict economic sense since it doesn’t directly produce surplus value. However, their position involves both mental and manual labour aspects, and they are part of what he calls the social reproduction of labour power. This work of helping maintain the workforce that capitalism needs, or (re)producing the actual bodies to do the labour. You may also notice the entrance of gendered thinking as we move through some of this theorisation particularly around (re)production, even though we know this is the most fundamental part of human existence it is often marginalised or backgrounded in sexist and fundamentally unhelpful ways.

A software developer at a tech company shows another complexity. They’re engaged in mental labour rather than manual labour, which might suggest new petty bourgeoisie status. However, if they are directly involved in producing software as a commodity that generates surplus value, they might be considered productive workers despite not fitting traditional images of working-class labour. A retail worker at a chain store represents what Poulantzas would call commercial labour. While they’re clearly part of the working class in terms of their economic position (selling labour power, no ownership of means of production), they’re not directly producing surplus value but rather helping realise it through the sale of commodities. While some of this nuancing is helpful for specific analysis of class, the categorisation of anyone not working in a precious metals mine in the south of the African continent (almost literally by modern standards) is limiting and limited in thinking and analysis.

Through Poulantzas’s theoretical framework, Fillipe occupies a distinctively complex class position that exemplifies the intricate dynamics of state power reproduction — or, perhaps, considerable time wasting waiting for the revolution. As member of the nouveau petit bourgeoisie they are situated within a nexus of economic, political, and ideological relations that transcends productive categories. They are engaging in mental labour that organises and mediates class relations rather than directly generating surplus value. Their position within the state apparatus grants them relative autonomy while simultaneously embedding them in the reproduction of existing social relations, creating a profound contradiction where they both ameliorate and perpetuate class inequalities through their role in managing social cohesion. This structural position, determined by their place in the combined economic-political-ideological matrix rather than their class origin, would result in a petit bourgeoisie status and a static framing of state functionaries whose role, to Poulantzas, might be simultaneously to work addressing subordinate class conditions while directly helping to reproduce the system of class relations they seek to reform. “Reformism bad” is the productive message, but it is easy to read Poulantzas as effectively a capitalist realist with no potential for base transformation because of capitals capacity for transmutation.

Naturally, Gramsci is not without possibility for critique. Gramsci’s framework requires organic intellectuals who hold with their class origin and gain and wield sufficient power to genuinely create a collective which can transform systems of our very existence for radical and different ends. This heroism and frankly somewhat internally contradictory positioning of organic intellectuals for class transformation is difficult if not impossible. For instance, our civil servant will never be positioned as an organic intellectual for the communities which they seek to serve because they are not members of that social group — not in the originary sense. This, also, limits the possibility for transformative agency. And transformative agency, praxis, is what we’re most interested in here on mind reader. I should also log, at this juncture, that because Gramsci wrote from prison and was subject to significant censorship, as Anderson has discussed at length, social group, for example, may well have been code for class in his writing, but we will never truly know if this is categorically distinct from Marx’s definitions or if it is a direct evolution. But let’s end with hope and action from both understandings of class built on the work of Marx.

For Gramsci, our civil servant could potentially play a significant role in social transformation through their position as an intellectual within the state apparatus. Gramsci sees intellectuals as crucial organisers of social groups’ political projects. A civil servant in social inclusion, particularly one from a working-class background, might even function an organic intellectual. A person who can articulate and organise the interests of subaltern groups within state institutions. This could involve using their position to create spaces for subaltern voices, redirect resources, or challenge dominant interpretations of social problems.

However, Poulantzas would be more sceptical of this transformative potential. In his framework, the civil servant’s position within the state apparatus is structurally determined in ways that tend to reproduce existing class relations, regardless of individual intentions. Their role in managing social inclusion is part of what he sees as the state’s function in organising the political unity of the ruling class while disorganising subordinate classes. Even when they try to advocate for subaltern groups, they are still operating within structures that ultimately maintain class domination.

The key difference lies in how they understand the relationship between structure and agency (or myriad different words for this debate that are not central to our discussion). Gramsci sees more possibility for strategic action within existing institutions — importantly, though, not reformism. He believes that organic intellectuals, including potentially progressive civil servants, can help build counter-hegemonic forces from within the state apparatus. This could involve creating trenches, institutional positions from which to advance alternative social projects. A hopeful future in collective imagining and working.

Poulantzas, while not completely dismissive of individual agency, instead advances how class positions within the state apparatus create objective effects that operate regardless of subjective intentions. Our civil servant might sincerely want to advance subaltern interests, but their position within the mental/manual labour division and their role in managing rather than transforming social relations limits their capacity for genuine transformation. This, naturally, has practical implications for how we understand change and the potential for change. Following Gramsci, we might encourage civil servants to consciously connect their work to broader subaltern movements, using their institutional position to create spaces for genuine bottom-up participation and organisation — or flatly anti-authoritarian movements leveraging the apparatus of the state. This could involve finding ways to transfer real decision-making power to affected communities rather than just managing their inclusion. Following Poulantzas, we would be more focused on how structural transformation of the state apparatus itself is necessary for genuine social change. The civil servant’s role would be more about understanding and potentially helping to expose the contradictions in their position rather than trying to use it for progressive ends.

The latter position remains interesting to me, despite my own objections to Poulantzas’s theorisations. In an almost anarchist modality, Poulantzas nearly suggests burning it down through thinking. You can’t say that’s not somewhat appealing. Gramsci helps us see how individuals within institutions might contribute to transformative projects, while Poulantzas reminds us of the structural limitations of such efforts. Perhaps the most productive approach would be to combine these insights? Recognising both the possibilities and limitations of working within state institutions while maintaining a clear focus on the need for broader structural transformation.

Thanks for sticking through this (lengthy) one! More on this to come.

In solidarity,

Aidan

[Throughout] Poulantzas, N. (1975). Classes in contemporary capitalism (D. Fernbach, Trans.). NLB.; Poulantzas, N. (1973). Political power and social classes (T. O'Hagan, Trans.). NLB.; Gramsci, A. (2007). Selections from the prison notebooks of Antonio Gramsci (Q. Hoare & G. Nowell-Smith, Trans.; Reprinted). Lawrence and Wishart.; Gramsci, A. (with Bordiga, A., & Tasca, A.). (1977). Selections from political writings (1910-1920) (Q. Hoare & J. Mathews, Trans.). Lawrence and Wishart.


  1. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/ch01.htm ↩︎

Autocorrect

Has anyone else noticed that Apple’s iOS keyboard/autocorrect recommendations in the latest iOS no longer autocorrect the word fascism? They’ve literally given it the same treatment as low level swears. Fascinating what this very small move signals about corporate views of fascism in the US. We’re living it — and we’re moving towards not being allowed to talk about it. Too few own the means of knowledge sharing and critique. Meta and Twitter are not public goods.

Happy new year from mind reader

Thank you, reader, for your ongoing support. We’ve read more than 500 bookmarks and 30 dispatches together over 2024. We need strong analysis of the political landscape shaping our very thought, and your participation in this space contributes to that necessary thinking. Greatly look forward to continuing the radical dissemination project here across 2025 with you. Here’s to another year of anti-capitalist thought! Perhaps this will be the year of revolution.